Results | SCC-Authors-Cited

Coughlan, S. (2007). Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law. Criminal Reports, 6th, 47, 266.

Coughlan, S. (2012). Charter Protection against Unlawful Police Action: Less Black and White Than It Seems. Supreme Court Law Review, 2d, 57(1). https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1237

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Skolnik, T., & MacDonnell, V. (2021). Policing Arbitrariness: Fleming v. Ontario and the Ancillary Powers Doctrine. Supreme Court Law Review, 100(1), 187. https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1417

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Harmon, R. A. (2011). The problem of policing. Michigan Law Review, 110, 761.

Jochelson, R. (2007). Crossing the rubicon: Of sniffer dogs, justifications, and preemptive deference. Review of Constitutional Studies, 13, 209.

Berger, B. L. (2004). Race and Erasure in *R. v. Mann*. 21(6th), 58.

Jochelson, R. (2011). Ancillary Issues with Oakes: The Development of the Waterfield Test and the Problem of Fundamental Constitutional Theory. Ottawa Law Review, 43, 355.

Jochelson, R., Ireland, D., Ziegler, R., Brenner, E., & Kramar, K. (2020). Generation and Deployment of Common Law Police Powers by Canadian Courts and the Double-Edged Charter. Critical Criminology, 28(1), 107–126. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-020-09491-8

In recent years, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) has been relied on increasingly by Canadian courts to bolster common law police powers, often at the expense of due process. Ostensibly, the courts have shown more concern with the administration of the limits of policing than with the delineation of civil liberties. In this article, we trace the evolution of the interpretation of the Charter in this context, with early decisions suggesting a reluctance to create ex post facto police powers. The article then outlines the acceleration of judicial proliferation of common law police powers in Canada, cloaked in the veil of the Charter. In other words, unauthorized police conduct is legitimized by the courts on an ad hoc basis, so long as it is ultimately justifiable. We then discuss the findings of our own research into this phenomenon and comment on the possible implications that increasingly expansive common law police powers created by courts have had on due process in Canada, and the administrative role of the Supreme Court of Canada in mobilizing civil rights protections in the direction of state surveillance.

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Katz, L. (2008). Exclusion and exclusivity in property law. University of Toronto Law Journal, 58(3), 275–315. https://doi.org/10.3138/utlj.58.3.275

In this article, I propose a model for understanding the concept of ownership that I call the ‘exclusivity model.’ Like many of the contemporary critics of the ‘bundle of rights’ approach to ownership, I insist that ownership is a legal concept with a well-defined structure. I differ from most of them, however, in the model of ownership that I believe to be at work in property law. Most of these critics propose a model of ownership that emphasizes the owner's right to exclude non-owners from the owned thing as the central defining feature of ownership. I call this the ‘boundary approach’ to highlight its fixation on the owner's power to decide who may cross the boundaries of the owned thing. But this, I argue, makes it impossible for the boundary approach to explain adequately the many subsidiary rights in things that coexist with the rights of owners. Indeed, I argue that when we look more closely at the structure of ownership in property law, its central concern is not the exclusion of all non-owners from the owned thing but, rather, the preservation of the owner's position as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned thing. So long as others – whether they be holders of subsidiary property rights or strangers to the property – act in a way that is consistent with the owner's agenda, they pose no threat to the owner's exclusive position as agenda setter.

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Skolnik, T. (2021). Racial Profiling and the Perils of Ancillary Police Powers. Canadian Bar Review, 99(2), 429–462.

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Marin, J. R. (2004). R. v. Mann: Further down the Slippery Slope Comment. Alberta Law Review, 42(4), 1123–1136. https://doi.org/10.29173/alr1279

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Young, A. N. (2002). Fundamental Justice and Political Power: A Personal Reflection on Twenty Years in the Trenches. Supreme Court Law Review, 16(2d), 1. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676379

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Skibinsky, C. (2006). Regulating Mann in Canada. Saskatchewan Law Review, 69(1), 197–220.

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Quigley, T. (2004). *Mann*, It’s a Disappointing Decision. Criminal Reports, 21(6th), 41.

Skolnik, T. (2022). Rééquilibrer le rôle de la Cour suprême du Canada en procédure criminelle. McGill Law Journal, 67(3), 259–294. https://doi.org/10.7202/1098443ar

During the last two decades, the Supreme Court of Canada created and authorized new police powers that are exercised routinely. For example, the Court authorized police officers to stop motor vehicles at random, detain individuals for investigative purposes, and carry out preventive frisk searches on people. The Court stated that judges can use the “ancillary powers doctrine” to create new police powers that fill legislative gaps.

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Stribopoulos, J. (2005). In search of dialogue: The supreme court, police powers and the Charter. Queen’s Law Journal, 31, 1.

Tulloch, M. H. (2018). Report of the Independent Street Checks Review. Court of Appeal for Ontario.

Stribopoulos, J. (2003). A Failed Experiment - Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later. Alberta Law Review, 41(2), 335–394. https://doi.org/10.29173/alr1328

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Raz, J. (2009). The authority of law: essays on law and morality (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Quigley, T. (2003). Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson Forum: Stop in the Name of the Law: What Law - Racial Profiling and Police Practice in Canada. Alberta Law Review, 41(4), 935–950. https://doi.org/10.29173/alr1314

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