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Federal elections between 2008 and 2019 saw a great of volatility in Quebec, with important consequences for election outcomes. The surge in New Democratic Party (NDP) support in Quebec led the party to official opposition, while Liberal gains in 2011 led the party to a majority government, and Bloc Québécois gains in 2019 helped to reduce the Liberals to a minority. To what extent was this volatility driven by voters switching parties and to what degree was it driven by voters entering and exiting the electorate? This article uses ecological inference based on riding-level data to examine the dynamics of party competition in Quebec from 2008 to 2019. We show that while voter mobilization mattered to volatility, vote switching was the important driver of changing party fortunes during this period., RésuméLes élections fédérales entre 2008 et 2019 ont connu une grande volatilité au Québec, avec des conséquences importantes sur les résultats électoraux. La poussée du soutien du NPD au Québec a conduit le parti à l'opposition officielle, tandis que les gains des libéraux en 2011 ont conduit le parti à un gouvernement majoritaire et que les gains du Bloc Québécois en 2019 ont contribué à réduire les libéraux à une minorité. Dans quelle mesure cette volatilité est-elle due au fait que les électeurs changent de parti et dans quelle mesure est-elle due au fait que les électeurs entrent et sortent de l'électorat ? Cet article utilise l'inférence écologique basée sur des données au niveau des circonscriptions pour examiner la dynamique de la concurrence entre les partis au Québec de 2008 à 2019. Nous montrons que, bien que la mobilisation des électeurs ait joué un rôle dans la volatilité, le changement de parti a été le principal moteur de l'évolution de la situation des partis au cours de cette période.

This article examines, from the standpoint of corrective justice, three basic situations of causal uncertainty in the law of negligence. In the first situation the uncertainty is about which of the possible defendants wrongfully caused the injury. In the second situation the uncertainty is whether the injury resulted from the innocent or the wrongful aspect of the defendant’s activity. In the third situation the uncertainty is whether the defendant’s negligence failed to prevent the materialisation of an independently existing risk. In viewing the parties as the doer and the sufferer of the same injustice, corrective justice confirms the centrality of causation to negligence liability. The article shows, nonetheless, how these three situations of uncertainty can be resolved within the corrective justice framework. Moreover, what emerges from the corrective justice analysis is that causal uncertainty is not a homogeneous problem; its solution varies with the kind of situation in which the uncertainty appears.

Polls have had a number of high-profile misses in recent elections. We review the current polling environment, the performance of polls in a historical context, the mechanisms of polling error, and the causes of several recent misses in Britain and the US. Contrary to conventional wisdom, polling errors have been constant over time, although the level of error has always been substantially beyond that implied by stated margins of error. Generally, there is little evidence that voters lying about their vote intention (so-called ‘shy’ voters) is a substantial cause of polling error. Instead, polling errors have most commonly resulted from problems with representative samples and weighting, undecided voters breaking in one direction, and to a lesser extent late swings and turnout models. We conclude with a discussion of future directions for polling both in terms of fixing the problems identified and new approaches to understanding public opinion.

This article reviews Canadian cases involving claims for misfeasance in a public office that have been decided since the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse. Three main trends are apparent. First, plaintiffs who claim in misfeasance have some procedural advantages, including an expanded scope of discovery and greater resistance to defendants’ motions to strike. Second, the misfeasance tort serves an “ombudsman” function, tainting the defendant’s conduct as abusive and providing a greater degree of psychological vindication to plaintiffs. Finally, in some limited circumstances, misfeasance claims may have a better chance of success than negligence claims, as they dispense with the somewhat troublesome requirements of proximity and policy.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

La progression des droits linguistiques au Nouveau-Brunswick dans une perspective historique globale Gatan Migneault* the evolution of The linguistic situation in New Brunswick is unique in the Canadian context. Not only does the province currently offer one of the most generous and progressive legal regimes for its French-speaking linguistic minority, this regime proceeded in the … Continued

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

In 2015 a new offence came into effect in England and Wales: controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship. Three years later, similar offences were introduced in Scotland and Ireland. And it is perhaps less well known that France introduced a comparable offence in 2010 and the Australian State of Tasmania had introduced related offences of economic and emotional abuse in 2004. These offences, which criminalise non-physical abuse in domestic relationships, constitute a novel development in the criminal law, with distinctive features and challenges. This article discusses a number of legal issues that have emerged from the operation of the new offence in England and Wales. An analysis of prosecutions for controlling or coercive behaviour (235 successful convictions have been identified as of December 2018) gives some insight into special features of the offence and its impact. In the absence of primary data (such as case reports) or comprehensive secondary statistical data, media reports of cases in which people have been charged with and/or convicted of the new offence in England and Wales since it came into operation in December 2015 provide a useful basis on which to explore the operation of the offence. Our research appears to have identified about half of all successful prosecutions (107 cases) as of 28 April 2018, which was 28 months after the offence came into effect. As these reports were primarily descriptive accounts of judges’ in-court remarks, they provide an adequate basis on which to make some preliminary observations. This article identifies four legal issues that have emerged in the operation of the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour: uncertainty about which relationships are captured by the new offence; how to preserve the principle of non-retroactivity when criminalising courses of conduct (involving behaviours that may have been manifest for many years); evidentiary difficulties in criminalising courses of conduct (patterns of behaviour); and reconciling an apparent overlap between the new offence and traditional assault and threat offences.

L’article 2926.1 CcQ rend imprescriptibles les actions civiles liées aux violences sexuelles, conjugales et infantiles, dans la mesure où elles constituent un préjudice corporel. Or, le critère du préjudice corporel qu’impose cet article soulève plusieurs enjeux lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer quelles victimes de violences sexuelles, conjugales et infantiles peuvent bénéficier de l’imprescriptibilité de leur action en réparation. Ces enjeux découlent d’une incertitude entourant le concept de préjudice corporel, dont la définition exige qu’un certain seuil soit dépassé pour qu’un acte sur le corps soit considéré comme une atteinte à l’intégrité physique.

Personal autonomy is a constitutive element of all rights. It confers upon a right-holder the power to decide whether, and under what circumstances, to exercise her right. Every right infringement thus invariably involves a violation of its holder’s autonomy. The autonomy violation consists of the deprivation of a right-holder of a choice that was rightfully hers – the choice as to how to go about her life. Harms resulting from the right’s infringement and from the autonomy violation are often readily distinguishable, as is the case when someone uses the property of a right-holder without securing her permission or, worse, causes her bodily injury. At other times, however, the two harms overlap, as in the case when a right-holder is unlawfully barred from exercising her free speech right or is denied the right to vote. Furthermore, the autonomy harm may sometimes exceed the physical harm sustained by the victim, as is the case in many sexual harassment incidents. At other times, however, the victim’s physical harm or economic loss will outweigh the autonomy harm, as is often the case in automobile accidents. Even though autonomy violations are omnipresent, and the harm resulting from them can be severe, the law rarely recognizes a cause of action for violations of autonomy, nor does it provide redress for autonomy harms. The current legal approach to autonomy protection can best be characterized as anomalous and unprincipled. Therefore, from a normative perspective, it is untenable. In this article, we set out to make three novel theoretical and doctrinal contributions. First, we advance a comprehensive jurisprudential account of the relationship between rights and autonomy. Second, we show why existing law should be replaced with a legal regime that respects and protects individual autonomy in all cases. Finally, we develop a remedial framework designed to address autonomy violations. Mindful of administrability constraints, we incorporate three limitations to ensure that our proposal does not overwhelm the court system: (a) suits for autonomy violations would only be allowed when the plaintiff has a cause of action originating from the defendant’s infringement of her recognized legal right; (b) any such suit would undergo a strict de minimis scrutiny; and (c) no double recovery would be allowed in cases in which the plaintiff’s autonomy harm is subsumed in her physical or economic loss.

This paper explores the progressive possibilities presented by two areas of private law – family law and tort law – in achieving economic justice for women who have been victims of domestic violence. The author first considers the role spousal support law might play in providing economic redress following abuse. While the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Leskun v. Leskun suggests that a court might consider the consequences of spousal misconduct when making a support order, courts remain reluctant to use support awards to address the economic impact of abuse. By contrast, tort law may appear to provide a more responsive framework for battered women. Women may use the tort of battery to seek damages to compensate for direct financial impact of the violence (e.g. medical expenses) and for indirect economic harm (e.g diminished employability). However, the challenges inherent in bringing a successful tort action mean that women rarely succeed in achieving compensation. The author concludes by considering other options (e.g. a public compensation scheme) which may be a solution for women seeking financial compensation for the harms suffered at the hands of a violent spouse.

There has been a growing momentum toward a greater recognition and explicit use of Indigenous laws in the past several years. According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report, the revitalization and recognition of Indigenous laws are essential to reconciliation in Canada. How, then, do we go about doing this? In this article, we introduce one method, which we believe has great potential for working respectfully and productively with Indigenous laws today. We engage with Indigenous legal traditions by carefully and consciously applying adapted common law tools, such as legal analysis and synthesis, to existing and often publicly available Indigenous resources: stories, narratives, and oral histories. By bringing common pedagogical approaches from many Indigenous legal traditions together with standard common law legal education, we hope to help people learn Indigenous laws from an internal point of view. We share experiences that reveal that this method holds great potential as a pedagogical bridge “into” respectful engagement with Indigenous laws and legal thought, within and across Indigenous, academic, and professional communities. In conclusion, we argue that, while this method is a useful tool, it is not intended to supplant existing learning and teaching methods, but rather to supplement them. In practice, we have seen that this method can be complementary to learning deeply through other means. There are many methods to engage with Indigenous laws, and there needs to be critical reflection and conversations about them all.