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Rightly regarded as the leading doctrinal textbook on criminal law in England and Wales, this resource owes its consistent popularity to its accessible style, depth of analysis and breadth of coverage. Over 50 years since the publication of the first edition, Professor David Ormerod and Karl Laird continue the tradition set down by Professors Sir John Smith and Brian Hogan by producing a textbook of unrivalled quality

This paper explores the implications of the idea of a constitution appropriate to a liberal-democratic state for the law of self-defence. The law governing self-defence, like other laws, must also a test of substantive legality appropriate to the constitution: it must be one that could not reasonably be rejected by a person who is a member of a civil condition created with the purpose of curing the insecurities of the state of nature. While this test of substantive legality is insufficiently powerful to determine all the details of the law of self-defence, it does have several important implications. First, the positive law must recognize a right of self-defence in the core case where the defender responds with necessary and proportionate force to a wrongful threat; second, the positive law must also provide at least an excuse leading to acquittal where the defender is reasonably mistaken about one of the conditions in the core case. Furthermore, the positive law must acquit a person who uses necessary and proportionate force to repel an innocent threat because the civil condition can provide no reason for punishing such a person.

With little public discussion, the Canadian law of self-defence has become, in important respects, more permissive than Florida’s Stand Your Ground law. This article provides original historical research into the origins of the Canadian law of self-defence that reveals the evolution of its current conceptual features. It compares these features with the features of the Florida law and warns that in climates of fear, despite Canadian safeguards, Canada’s law is vulnerable to biased or unprincipled application. The Gerald Stanley case in Battleford Saskatchewan serves as a warning. The author argues that Stanley’s successful accident defence in the homicide of Colten Boushie was, in fact, predicated on dangerous notions of defence of property and defence of person that prioritize the protection of property, liberty, and honour over human life.

This study analyzes the arguments employed by Quebec judges when deciding whether a clause is abusive under article 1437 of the Civil Code of Québec. This analysis is inspired by the common law distinction between the substantive and procedural aspects of contractual unfairness. Thus, courts often invoke substantive factors to assess a clause’s abusive character, such as the equivalence of the obligations, proportionality, reciprocity, commutativity, departure from the usual obligations or from the essential obligation and causal link. However, it was found that courts also rely on procedural criteria to assess abuse, such as the information given to the adhering party concerning the contents of the contract as well as compliance with the adhering party’s reasonable expectations.

Has French law abandoned the concept of « cause » ? That is the impression one might have on reading the new provisions of the Civil Code, introduced by the Ordonnance of 10 February 2016, and certain commentaries. Accused of being a source of deviance and misunderstanding, the « cause » had to be eradicated, it was said, so that clarity, security and attractiveness of the Code be restored. A closer look, however, shows how far from reality this much-told fable actually is. Two sets of factors bear witness to the perennity of the « cause » in the new law. Firstly, the vast majority of previous « cause »-based solutions are taken up by new provisions. The « cause » remains but its presence is masked by a new designation (« motive » or « purpose », for example). Secondly, there are situations where, in a quest for coherence or in order to fill a gap, a « cause »-based reasoning will prevail exactly as it did before the reform. When all is said and done, it is a strange reform that removes the name while allowing the substance to remain.

A review of recent jurisprudence and doctrine points to the emergence of a new category of contractual obligation : the essential obligation. An array of texts, more numerous in France than in Québec, highlights and attempts to define the notion. Nevertheless, because of the quantitative and qualitative importance of the elements that characterize each proposed doctrinal definition, none is truly satisfactory. We have no choice but to admit that the number of concerns and criticisms raised in connection with the notion make it difficult to circumscribe its actual meaning. In this article, after setting out some doctrinal definitions and the main uncertainties surrounding the notion, we will try to uncover its true meaning by reviewing the ways in which it is used. We will show that the essential obligation has earned a place in the increasingly broad and specialized set of restrictions on contractual freedom.

Stéphanie Ghozlan, 2015 49-2 Revue juridique Thémis de l'Université de Montréal 399, 2015 CanLIIDocs 4942

«Le Code civil du Québec étant en vigueur depuis près de 20 ans, la jurisprudence et la doctrine interprétant les dispositions du code sont maintenant très abondantes. Par ailleurs, ayant été responsable à l’Université Laval du cours portant sur la vente, le louage et le contrat d’entreprise et de services pendant plus de 30 ans, cet ouvrage a pour but de fournir aux étudiants un ouvrage leur permettant non seulement d’apprendre les rudiments de ces matières mais encore d’y réfléchir en faisant les liens appropriés avec les autres domaines du droit ayant unimpact sur l’application du droit des contrats. Le volume leur permet aussi de compléter leurs informations par des références à la jurisprudence et à la doctrine récentes, ou aux décisions plus anciennes rendues sous l’ancien code, qui conservent leur pertinence. Observons que contrairement au Code civil du Bas Canada, le Code civil du Québec, ne reprend pas toujours dans les chapitres consacrés à la vente, au louage ou au contrat d’entreprise, les règles importantes du droit général des obligations. Il faut donc être en mesure d’établir les liens qui s’imposent. D’autre part, l’exercice des recours prévus par ces différents contrats fait appel au Code de procédure civile et au droit administratif. Mentionnons seulement ici la Régie du logement, ou les règles régissant la formation des contrats d’entreprise pour la construction d’ouvrages immobiliers, avec les gouvernements et les municipalités. Le présent ouvrage est à la fois théorique et pratique. Il est théorique car il expose les principes du droit, mais il est aussi pratique car il attire l’attention sur les clauses contractuelles opportunes et les allégations et conclusions des actes de procédure destinés à permettre aux parties de faire valoir leurs droits. !fauteur espère que cet ouvrage sera utile non seulement aux étudiants pendant leurs études, mais aussi après, quand ils exerceront leur profession. C’est d’ailleurs à leur intention qu’ont été fournies les abondantes références jurisprudentielles et doctrinales dans les notes infrapaginales.»-- Résumé de l'éditeur