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Citizenship is a key factor in the development of national identity. Any system for establishing and defining citizenship is meaningless as a tool for the creation of such an identity, however, without control of the mechanisms by which this system is designed and implemented. In this paper I propose to examine the constitutional status of an Aboriginal right to control the design and implementation of citizenship codes. As the judiciary in Canada begins to grapple with questions of Aboriginal self-determination, it must begin to consider the extent to which its own vision of Canada as a constitutional democracy, currently engaged in a project of reconciling Aboriginal peoples to the sovereignty of the Crown, will set out parameters for locating and constructing such a right. Within the confines of constitutional law in Canada, do Aboriginal peoples have a right to design and implement their own citizenship codes, free from interference from Canadian governments? Alternatively, is there such a right, but subject to some measure of control by the Crown, and perhaps subject to other constitutional instruments, such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
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Section 25 of the 'Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' is an important, yet not fully understood, interpretive provision. This section plays an important role in Canada's constitutional framework by shielding the rights of aboriginal people from negative impacts that the 'Charter' may have on such rights. However, the exact scope and significance of the role that section 25 plays in 'Charter' interpretation is uncertain. Through a textual analysis of section 25, this paper attempts to provide guidance on the provision's possible interpretation and application. In particular, the implementation of section 25 and the maintenance of a balance between the individual and collective rights of aboriginal people will be explored Such commentary is required because the role of section 25 will inevitably become more relevant as more aboriginal self-government agreements and arrangements are concluded.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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The regulation of Native identity has been central to the colonization process in both Canada and the United States. Systems of classification and control enable settler governments to define who is “Indian,” and control access to Native land. These regulatory systems have forcibly supplanted traditional Indigenous ways of identifying the self in relation to land and community, functioning discursively to naturalize colonial worldviews. Decolonization, then, must involve deconstructing and reshaping how we understand Indigenous identity.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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This article draws on debates about the ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory to consider the normative challenges raised by descent-based Aboriginal membership rules in Canada. The boundary paradox is one of the most intractable puzzles of democratic theory. If a demos is necessarily bounded, so that some people are excluded, what normative principle could justify these exclusions? Liberal theory tends to insist on the primacy of consent as the basis of political society and so fails to explain the reliance of liberal democracies on birthright membership, especially the distribution of citizenship to foreign-born descendants of citizens. Applied to expressly kinship-based polities like Aboriginal communities, liberal approaches prioritize non-discrimination, potentially denying to those communities the capacity to distribute membership by reference to characteristics listed as ‘prohibited grounds’ in human rights law, including, most problematically, race and ethnicity. The article outlines the parallels between Canadian citizenship law, the Indian Act regime, and First Nations’ membership codes, and examines the distinctive role to be played by section 35 of Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 in tempering non-discrimination logics. It concludes that existing justificatory tests (the ‘valid legislative object’ test, and the section 1 ‘reasonable limits’ test) are unlikely to provide a way forward, but that a promising methodology can be discerned in Canadian law and policy, in which the ‘reasonableness’ of Aboriginal descent–based exclusions is assessed relative to the characteristics of a free and democratic Aboriginal community. I suggest that this adaptation of liberal non-discrimination norms is an expression of the continuing importance of kinship and descent boundaries in settler-state constitutionalism. Although many questions remain to be resolved, Canadian human rights laws and methodologies could assist in the primary challenge posed to settler-state political theory: the reconciliation of tribal and liberal forms of political organization.
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Aboriginal law disputes are disputes that arise in the spaces between Indigenous and non-Indigenous societies. To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has resolved Aboriginal law disputes under section 35 by relying heavily on the common law to the exclusion of Indigenous legal traditions and principles. In this article, the author argues that applying a bijural interpretation of the principle of respect provides a promising pathway forward in resolving Aboriginal law disputes in a way that supports the grand purpose of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982—reconciliation. The author discusses the principle of respect by considering both non-Indigenous and Indigenous theories to propose a robust conception of respect to guide Aboriginal law jurisprudence. She then suggests three ways to implement the principle of respect in the intercultural relationship: (1) making interdependence and relationships primary; (2) rejecting colonial attitudes and stereotypes of Indigenous peoples; and (3) creating political and legal space for the expression and flourishing of cultural difference.
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