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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

This article traces the evolution of the Canadian approach to privateinternational law from Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye to Castillo v. Castillo and identifiesfour major flaws that have significant implications for both privateinternational law and Canadian federalism: (1) ambiguous and inconsistentterminology that undermines the conceptual foundation of this approach whileobscuring its potential impact; (2) the Court’s use of American conflict oflaws jurisprudence to reinforce a deferential orientation in Canadianprivate international law; (3) the Court’s vision of the international orderand understanding of public international law, which has begun to affect theCanadian federal system; and (4) the model of the Canadian Constitutionemployed in these cases, which may have broad negative consequences forprovincial interests. The article argues that these flaws are remediable,that both constitutional text and recent opinions contain resources usefulto this end, and that, however the Court decides to address these problems,subsequent iterations of the Canadian approach to private international lawshould emphasize clarity, consistency, and comprehensiveness., Sommaire Cet article trace l’évolution de l’approche canadienne au droitinternational privé à partir de Morguard Investments Ltd. c. De Savoye jusqu’à Castillo v. Castillo. Il cernequatre défauts majeurs qui ont des conséquences significatifs tant pour ledroit international privé que pour le fédéralisme canadien, dont: (1)l’emploi d’une terminologie ambiguë et contradictoire qui mine lesfondements conceptuels de cette approche tout en déguisant son impactpotentiel; (2) l’utilisation par la Cour de la jurisprudence américaine enmatière de droit international privé pour justifier une orientationdéférentielle en droit international privé canadien; (3) la vision de laCour de l’ordre international et sa compréhension du droit internationalpublic, qui ont des effets sur le système fédéral canadien; et (4) le modèlede la constitution canadienne révélée dans ces cas, qui pourrait avoir desérieux effets négatifs sur les intérêts provinciaux. L’article affirme queces défauts peuvent être rémédiés, que les textes constitutionnels et desopinions récentes révèlent des ressources utiles à cette fin, et que, peuimporte la façon dont la Cour s’y prend pour adresser ces problèmes,l’approche future du Canada au droit international privé doit avant toutêtre claire, uniforme et compréhensive.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Because of its structuring function, private international law tends to be given a status distinct from the ordinary rules of domestic law. In a federal system, private international law of necessity implicates some aspects of the constitution. In a series of cases beginning in 1990 the Supreme Court of Canada has engaged in a striking reorientation of Canadian private international law, premised on a newly articulated relationship between private international law and the Canadian constitutional system. This constitutional dimension has been coupled with an enhanced notion of comity. The new dynamic has meant that changes in private international law that were initially prompted by constitutional considerations have gone further than the constitutional doctrines alone would demand. This paper traces these developments and uses them to show the challenges that the Supreme Court of Canada has faced since 1990 in constructing a relationship between Canada’s constitutional arrangements and its private international law. The court has fashioned the constitutional doctrines as drivers of Canadian private international law but its own recent jurisprudence shows difficulties in managing that relationship. The piece concludes with lessons to be learned from the experience of the last 25 years.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Basis for the jurisdiction to stay proceedings - comparison of Commonwealth countries - rationale for the jurisdiction to stay proceedings - relationship between jurisdiction and remedy.

An article from McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill, on Érudit.

It has been suggested that the Canadian prime minister tends to enjoy powers to a degree that is unhealthy in a democratic society. This article evaluates the "prime minister as autocrat" argument that has gained currency, if not in the academic literature, certainly in the popular media. It is suggested that while there has been a relative increase in the concentration of power in the centre — the centre defined as the prime minister, his entourage and key central agencies — the portrait of prime ministerial autocracy has been overdrawn. None the less, reforms are desirable. Particularly ones that create or enhance counterweights to prime ministerial power will likely improve Canadian democracy. These reforms should focus not so much on strengthening the role of individual MPs but on reinforcing the position of cabinet, the parliamentary caucus and senate vis-à-vis the prime minister. In this respect, five possible reforms are discussed, and their prospects of being adopted assessed: proportional representation for the House of Commons, an elected senate, strengthened parliamentary caucuses, a fixed time-table for elections and the New Zealand approach to the appointment of senior officials.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Abstract: Cabinet secrecy is a cornerstone of the constitution of the Westminster system of government and is safeguarded by convention, common law and statute law in leading Westminster regimes. Secrecy of cabinet proceedings is very much part of the efficient constitution, but the protections afforded by convention and law are neither well understood nor particularly popular. This article examines the convention and how it differs from the common law and statute law treatments of cabinet secrecy. It considers the essential requirements for cabinet secrecy: collective decision-making; the protection of the views and opinions of ministers; and several related problems of the constitution, including the role of the cabinet as the informal executive, the use of the cabinet as an administrative coordinating mechanism, and -unique to Canada - the use of statute law to remove the courts from their traditional role of determining the balance between individual rights and those of the state. Cabinet secrecy is essential to a system of government where responsible ministers collectively decide the government's policy, but in order to play a proper role in our affairs the convention on secrecy needs to be constitutionally validated by the articulation of its purpose and scope. Sommaire: Le secret ministériel est une pierre d'angle de la constitution de Westminster, protégé par la convention constitutionnelle, la common law et la législation dans les principaux pays du système de Westminster. Le secret ministériel fait intimement partie de la constitution efficace, mais les protections procurées par la convention et la Loi ne sont ni bien comprises N particulièrement bien vues. Cet article examine la convention et comment elle se démarque de la façon dont la common law et le droit législatif interprètent le secret ministériel. Il examine les conditions essenticlles du secret ministériel: la prise de décision collective et la protection des points de vue et opinions des ministres. II examine également plusieurs problèmes connexes de la constitution, y compris le rôle du cabinet comme le pouvoir exécutif officieux; le cabinet comme un mécanisme de coordination administrative et - propre au Canada

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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.