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A History of Law in Canada is an important [anticipated] three-volume project. Volume One begins at a time just prior to European contact and continues to the 1860s, Volume Two covers the half century after Confederation, and Volume Three will cover the period from the beginning of the First World War to 1982, with a postscript taking the account to approximately 2000.The history of law includes substantive law, legal institutions, legal actors, and legal culture. The authors assume that since 1500 there have been three legal systems in Canada – the Indigenous, the French, and the English. At all times, these systems have co-existed and interacted, with the relative power and influence of each being more or less dominant in different periods. The history of law cannot be treated in isolation, and this book examines law as a dynamic process, shaped by and affecting other histories over the long term. The law guided and was guided by economic developments, was influenced and moulded by the nature and trajectory of political ideas and institutions, and variously exacerbated or mediated intercultural exchange and conflict. These themes are apparent in this examination, and through most areas of law including land settlement and tenure, and family, commercial, constitutional, and criminal law. -- Adapted from publisher's description.

"Margaret Conrad's history of Canada begins with a challenge to its readers. What is Canada? What makes up this diverse, complex, and often contested nation-state? What was its founding moment? And who are its people? Drawing on her many years of experience as a scholar, writer, and teacher of Canadian history, Conrad offers astute answers to these difficult questions. Beginning in Canada's deep past with the arrival of its Indigenous peoples, she traces its history through the conquest by Europeans, the American Revolutionary War, and the industrialization of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to its prosperous present. As a social historian, Conrad emphasizes the peoples' history: the relationships between Indigenous peoples and settlers, French and English, Catholic and Protestant, rich and poor. She writes of the impact of disease, how women fared in the early colonies, and the social transformations that took place after the Second World War as Canada began to assert itself as an independent nation. It is this grounded approach that drives the narrative and makes for compelling reading. In its final chapters, the author explains the social, economic, and political upheavals that have bedeviled the nation in recent years. Despite its successes and its popularity as a destination for immigrants from across the world, Canada remains a cautious and contested country. This intelligent, concise, and lucid book explains just why that is"-- Provided by publisher.

In 2015 a new offence came into effect in England and Wales: controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship. Three years later, similar offences were introduced in Scotland and Ireland. And it is perhaps less well known that France introduced a comparable offence in 2010 and the Australian State of Tasmania had introduced related offences of economic and emotional abuse in 2004. These offences, which criminalise non-physical abuse in domestic relationships, constitute a novel development in the criminal law, with distinctive features and challenges. This article discusses a number of legal issues that have emerged from the operation of the new offence in England and Wales. An analysis of prosecutions for controlling or coercive behaviour (235 successful convictions have been identified as of December 2018) gives some insight into special features of the offence and its impact. In the absence of primary data (such as case reports) or comprehensive secondary statistical data, media reports of cases in which people have been charged with and/or convicted of the new offence in England and Wales since it came into operation in December 2015 provide a useful basis on which to explore the operation of the offence. Our research appears to have identified about half of all successful prosecutions (107 cases) as of 28 April 2018, which was 28 months after the offence came into effect. As these reports were primarily descriptive accounts of judges’ in-court remarks, they provide an adequate basis on which to make some preliminary observations. This article identifies four legal issues that have emerged in the operation of the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour: uncertainty about which relationships are captured by the new offence; how to preserve the principle of non-retroactivity when criminalising courses of conduct (involving behaviours that may have been manifest for many years); evidentiary difficulties in criminalising courses of conduct (patterns of behaviour); and reconciling an apparent overlap between the new offence and traditional assault and threat offences.

L’article 2926.1 CcQ rend imprescriptibles les actions civiles liées aux violences sexuelles, conjugales et infantiles, dans la mesure où elles constituent un préjudice corporel. Or, le critère du préjudice corporel qu’impose cet article soulève plusieurs enjeux lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer quelles victimes de violences sexuelles, conjugales et infantiles peuvent bénéficier de l’imprescriptibilité de leur action en réparation. Ces enjeux découlent d’une incertitude entourant le concept de préjudice corporel, dont la définition exige qu’un certain seuil soit dépassé pour qu’un acte sur le corps soit considéré comme une atteinte à l’intégrité physique.

Personal autonomy is a constitutive element of all rights. It confers upon a right-holder the power to decide whether, and under what circumstances, to exercise her right. Every right infringement thus invariably involves a violation of its holder’s autonomy. The autonomy violation consists of the deprivation of a right-holder of a choice that was rightfully hers – the choice as to how to go about her life. Harms resulting from the right’s infringement and from the autonomy violation are often readily distinguishable, as is the case when someone uses the property of a right-holder without securing her permission or, worse, causes her bodily injury. At other times, however, the two harms overlap, as in the case when a right-holder is unlawfully barred from exercising her free speech right or is denied the right to vote. Furthermore, the autonomy harm may sometimes exceed the physical harm sustained by the victim, as is the case in many sexual harassment incidents. At other times, however, the victim’s physical harm or economic loss will outweigh the autonomy harm, as is often the case in automobile accidents. Even though autonomy violations are omnipresent, and the harm resulting from them can be severe, the law rarely recognizes a cause of action for violations of autonomy, nor does it provide redress for autonomy harms. The current legal approach to autonomy protection can best be characterized as anomalous and unprincipled. Therefore, from a normative perspective, it is untenable. In this article, we set out to make three novel theoretical and doctrinal contributions. First, we advance a comprehensive jurisprudential account of the relationship between rights and autonomy. Second, we show why existing law should be replaced with a legal regime that respects and protects individual autonomy in all cases. Finally, we develop a remedial framework designed to address autonomy violations. Mindful of administrability constraints, we incorporate three limitations to ensure that our proposal does not overwhelm the court system: (a) suits for autonomy violations would only be allowed when the plaintiff has a cause of action originating from the defendant’s infringement of her recognized legal right; (b) any such suit would undergo a strict de minimis scrutiny; and (c) no double recovery would be allowed in cases in which the plaintiff’s autonomy harm is subsumed in her physical or economic loss.

Legislation has been updated up to Canada Gazette Vol 159: 19 (September10, 2025)

This paper explores the progressive possibilities presented by two areas of private law – family law and tort law – in achieving economic justice for women who have been victims of domestic violence. The author first considers the role spousal support law might play in providing economic redress following abuse. While the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Leskun v. Leskun suggests that a court might consider the consequences of spousal misconduct when making a support order, courts remain reluctant to use support awards to address the economic impact of abuse. By contrast, tort law may appear to provide a more responsive framework for battered women. Women may use the tort of battery to seek damages to compensate for direct financial impact of the violence (e.g. medical expenses) and for indirect economic harm (e.g diminished employability). However, the challenges inherent in bringing a successful tort action mean that women rarely succeed in achieving compensation. The author concludes by considering other options (e.g. a public compensation scheme) which may be a solution for women seeking financial compensation for the harms suffered at the hands of a violent spouse.

'Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Domestic Violence' published in 'Encyclopedia of Domestic Violence'