Your search
Results 933 resources
-
In recent years, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) has been relied on increasingly by Canadian courts to bolster common law police powers, often at the expense of due process. Ostensibly, the courts have shown more concern with the administration of the limits of policing than with the delineation of civil liberties. In this article, we trace the evolution of the interpretation of the Charter in this context, with early decisions suggesting a reluctance to create ex post facto police powers. The article then outlines the acceleration of judicial proliferation of common law police powers in Canada, cloaked in the veil of the Charter. In other words, unauthorized police conduct is legitimized by the courts on an ad hoc basis, so long as it is ultimately justifiable. We then discuss the findings of our own research into this phenomenon and comment on the possible implications that increasingly expansive common law police powers created by courts have had on due process in Canada, and the administrative role of the Supreme Court of Canada in mobilizing civil rights protections in the direction of state surveillance.
-
Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
-
Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
-
In this article, I propose a model for understanding the concept of ownership that I call the ‘exclusivity model.’ Like many of the contemporary critics of the ‘bundle of rights’ approach to ownership, I insist that ownership is a legal concept with a well-defined structure. I differ from most of them, however, in the model of ownership that I believe to be at work in property law. Most of these critics propose a model of ownership that emphasizes the owner's right to exclude non-owners from the owned thing as the central defining feature of ownership. I call this the ‘boundary approach’ to highlight its fixation on the owner's power to decide who may cross the boundaries of the owned thing. But this, I argue, makes it impossible for the boundary approach to explain adequately the many subsidiary rights in things that coexist with the rights of owners. Indeed, I argue that when we look more closely at the structure of ownership in property law, its central concern is not the exclusion of all non-owners from the owned thing but, rather, the preservation of the owner's position as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned thing. So long as others – whether they be holders of subsidiary property rights or strangers to the property – act in a way that is consistent with the owner's agenda, they pose no threat to the owner's exclusive position as agenda setter.
-
Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
-
Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
-
Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
-
Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
-
Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
Explore
Resource type
Topics
- Criminal law (1)
- Equity (1)
- Evidence (1)
- Voyeurism (1)
Publication year
-
Between 1900 and 1999
(212)
-
Between 1910 and 1919
(1)
- 1918 (1)
- Between 1930 and 1939 (5)
- Between 1940 and 1949 (6)
- Between 1950 and 1959 (8)
- Between 1960 and 1969 (14)
- Between 1970 and 1979 (18)
- Between 1980 and 1989 (58)
- Between 1990 and 1999 (102)
-
Between 1910 and 1919
(1)
-
Between 2000 and 2026
(720)
- Between 2000 and 2009 (253)
- Between 2010 and 2019 (304)
- Between 2020 and 2026 (163)
- Unknown (1)